🏠 > [[Interviews]] > December 4 2025 **Insider**: [[Adam Spice]] **Source**: [Goldman Sachs Industrials & Materials Conference](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ttmji4wSxis) **Date**: December 4 2025  🔗 Backup Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ttmji4wSxis ## Transcript ### Introduction (0:01) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs):** All right. Hi everybody. My name is Anthony Valentini. I’m the defense tech analyst here at Goldman Sachs. Thank you for joining us. I’m really excited to welcome Adam Spice, the CFO of Rocket Lab. Adam, thank you so much for being here with us today. **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (0:19):** Thanks for having me. ### Neutron Strategy: “No Smoking Hole in the Ground” (0:26) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (0:26):** I think a great place to start is maybe on Neutron. You guys recently announced the time frame for the first launch. Maybe something that could be helpful for people is if you can talk through the strategy— of why or how it’s a little different than some competitors where you won’t bring a rocket to the pad unless you think it’s going to be 100% successful? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (0:42):** It goes back to: if you’re going to be in this market, we think that there have been too many examples of companies bringing faulty products to market that weren’t ready for prime time. The appetite for mission failure is zero with our customers. We know it happens, it’s the nature of the launch business to a certain extent, but you don’t ever willingly go in knowing you want to take more risk than is prudent. I think Pete is a hardcore engineer at his core. He understands the product at a level most other CEOs, i think probably don’t have that familiarity, because he designed and built Electron with his own hands—Electron has now launched, I think, 77 times. With each one of those launches, you learn so much and you understand where the risk is in the vehicle. And in his process In developing a new rocket, he’s leveraging everything we learned in Electron to make it as successful as it was. He’s not willing to cut corners to save schedule or to a certain extent cost. People won’t remember a three-month push to a schedule, but they will remember a big smoking hole in the ground. He’s absolutely not willing to take that risk. ### Neutron Timeline & What Has to Happen Next (2:01) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (2:01):** Makes a ton of sense, can you refresh everybody on the current timeline for Neutron for the first launch, and what needs to happen between now and then? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (2:07):** We talked in quite an amount of detail on our conference call about timing. Right now, the goal is to get a vehicle to the pad in Q1, and then launch as quickly thereafter as we can. So if you think about what it takes to bring a program like a medium-lift launch vehicle to market, there’s tremendous amount of coordination across the various disciplines: you've got engines, and avionics, and tanks, and pad infrastructure, and everything else that has to come together. The one thing that’s created a little bit more of a challenge with Neutron than we experienced with Electron is just the scale. If you’ve look at some of the pictures, maybe some of you folks have been on some of the forums lately, there's pictures\ of the “Hungry Hippo” fairing making its way through New Zealand. Ultimately, that fairing is going to be manufactured in the U.S. at our facility just outside of Baltimore, but initial prototyping was done in New Zealand because that’s where a lot of our carbon composite expertise resides. These things are huge— I was looking at one of the pictures this morning and you've got this massive transport truck pulling this huge fairing that's five and half meter diameter fairing, and quite long. Moving parts like that and getting them through qual is taking so much longer. When we were doing Electron, if you wanted to qualify something or do a tweak, you could pick up an engine with your hands and carry it across the factory. Now, an engine weighs more than a ton—you need cranes and all the different things. And when you’re moving these huge carbon structures, you have to be careful not to put stress on a joint that could take a long time to fix if you break something. We’re being very ginger with all of this stuff. We understand how important schedule is but until you're faced with the reality of staring into this huge structure that you've got to move and go 'yeah that fixture that we were thinking as going to do the job probably needs to be augmented here and there' and just taking a little bit longer. So the plan is to get everything to the pad in Q1. What does that mean? That means the rocket gets stacked and integrated on the pad, which is a little unique—other times it’s done in integration facilities. We’re stacking Neutron on the pad. Having that ready to go. Then you’re running final tests and getting the final license from the FAA and NASA. We’ve got a pretty well-defined path to get where we need to go. Rocket to the pad in Q1; launch as quickly thereafter as the final checkouts allow. ### Neutron Spend, Runway, and Cost Context vs. Other Programs (4:41) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (4:41):** What’s been the total cost of the project to date, and every quarter you delay, how much incremental cost should people be expecting? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (4:47):** The program, as we exit 2025, we will have spent about $360 million, across CapEx and R&D. If you think about what that's accomplished; that’s gotten us a brand-new pad at Wallops, it's gotten new integration facilities at Wallops, it's gotten a structures complex outside Baltimore, and it’s got Stennis test center. It's actually been a very efficient project from that perspective. So if you target a first half of 2026 launch, I think there’s probably another $40–$50 million of spend across R&D and CapEx to get us to that first launch. SO that'll put the program at about $400 million total, and it’ll have roughly taken about five years. The original estimate was $250–$300 million over about four years. So we experienced about a one-year total push and spending is about $100–$150 million above what we originally anticipated. But to put that in context: Blue Origin had a successful flight of New Glenn a couple weeks ago—very impressive, actually pretty encouraging for folks also looking to do the reusable ocean-landed architecture. This is anecdotal because Blue is private, but on the order of magnitude: I think it’s 14 years and probably north of $10 billion of investment. If you look at what it took to bring Vulcan to the pad, that was measured in almost a decade and many billions of dollars—maybe not as much as New Glenn, but that's the kind of neighborhood is where these programs usually occupy. We’re doing things in half or less the time and for orders of magnitude less in total spending. We’re trying to do aggressive things, we're always trying to push the envelope, and Neutron is no different. ### Demand for Neutron: Government vs. Commercial, and the “Two-Year Wait” (6:48) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (6:48):** Something that I hear from a lot of investors: what exactly are all the things we need to send to space, and how should people think through demand for Neutron? Is it more commercial? Is it more government? How many launches can there be in the future? And let's just maybe keep the part of your potential ambitions to have your own constellation aside. **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (7:15):** I think we’re somewhat fortunate in the fact that this is a new and expanding market, but we've have a pretty clear comparable peer with an established run rate— If you look at Falcon 9 that's really the only other medium-lift launch vehicle. Last year, I believe they launched about 134 times. This year, they were talking launching over 190—close to 200. But about 60% of those volumes are estimated to be captive to Starlink. So if you take that and say ok roughly 90-ish launches of merchant volume for Falcon 9, it’s been growing dramatically YoY. We think that there's a lot of market opportunity for Neutron. The easiest one to identify is the government side with NSSL launches, which we’re getting onboarded into that program. That program, the land that we're entering into is funded to the tune of about $5.4 billion of earmarked spend between now and the end of 2029. So that gives you one sense of the customer bucket of dollars. In order for us to start tapping that, we have to have a successful test launch of Neutron—once we have that, then they can start dropping task orders down to the lane for us to bid on. So clearly there's a large volume of launch in that lane that's expected from the government customer, but again, we have to unlock that with a successful test launch. On the commercial side, there’s also a lot of demand. To provide a little bit of context, the first wave of deployments of Amazon Project Kuiper—which is now called “Project LEO”, —which we’re not contracted for (to be clear), but to look at that opportunity, that’s about 90 launches across three providers over the next several years. Once that constellation like that needs to be reconstituted (LEO satellites don’t stay up as long as prior generations), reconstituting a constellation like that will take many dozens of launches per year. You’ve got a very tangible government opportunity which is just starting to ramp because a lot of these higher volume proliferated architectures like SDA are just now starting to be launched, and that's going to be a clear and present driver of launch demand for the foreseeable future, and then you've got the commercial side with things like Project Leo, Telesat Lightspeed, IRIS², etc. I think the demand is clearly there, and what the market needs is more than one player—and that's all it really has to choose from today. **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (9:57):** There’s a lot of talk in the industry about supply constraints. Just to frame that for people, If I was a satellite manufacturer/operator and wanted to send a bird into orbit today and I called SpaceX and said hey I want to do this, how long out would it be until I can get on the launch pad and get to orbit? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (10:10):** So the feedback we’re getting from customers is it’s about two years—when you want - and say "I'm ready to contract a launch on a Falcon 9", it takes about two years, is our understanding. **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (10:23):** I want to come back real quickly to the sizing of the number of launches available for Neutron. Clearly there's an existing market today for Falcon 9 for merchant launches which is approaching 100 probably going to be very easily above that in 2026 and beyond. Our target to get to our target margin model for Neutron given our pricing assumptions and cost for refurb and so forth. It only takes about 10 launches per year for us to actually get to our target margin model for this business - So we think the opportunity is much larger than that, but it doesn’t take a disproportionate amount of existing volume, without assuming the growth potential, to hit our marks. ### Margins: Electron Today and Neutron’s Path with Reusability (11:04) **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (11:04):** I think that's something that's misunderstood from the investment community is actually how strong the margins can be in launch. Can you speak a little bit about what the margins are today on Electron, and how that improves as volumes ramp on that product, and once you have Neutron, what that looks like with reusability? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (11:22):** I think most people understand that launch is a high fixed-cost business. Whether you’re launching once or 20 times, you have infrastructure to maintained. For us, for Electron, it’s about $40 million a year, that maintains our launch facilities, all our production overhead and so forth—excluding variable pieces like labor to build rockets. But if you just think about your fixed nut to kind of stay in that market. So if you’re launching just once a year, you've got a horribly unprofitable business. We’ve been pretty consistent in saying that if we get to 24 launches a year (two per month) for Electron, that’s where we hit the sweet spot of overhead absorption and margins—on a non-GAAP basis in the 45–50 point range. **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (11:04):** Gross Margins Right? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO)**: Gross Margins. Given guidance that we provided a few weeks ago (which embedded roughly seven launches in Q4), we’re kind of there— we don't need any material growth to drive us to get where we need to be. We’re knocking on that door as we speak. Again it kind of just reaffirms for us, cadence is super important: you need to get that overhead absorption rolling. ASP fortunately in our case has been helpful too—it’s been up and to the right the last few years, and we see that continuing in that direction given a lack of an real credible competition in certain segments of the market. So we think the demand is there, we’ve dialed in the production and scaling for Electron. Even at 24 launches per year which gets us to our target margin, we can build twice that—we can basically build a rocket per week with our existing footprint for Electron. So you can kind of imagine there's kind of margin gravy to come at anything above that level. **Anthony Valentini (Goldman Sachs) (13:19):** Is that the same framework that we should be thinking about for Neutron , or different given the reusability? **Adam Spice (Rocket Lab CFO) (13:26):** Yeah, I mentioned the fact that, you know, part of the challenge of Neutron is just the scale with the vehicle. The scale of production is greater, the launch pads are bigger, everything is bigger. So instead of ~$40 million per year standing cost, it’s more about like ~$80 million of standing cost. So if you think about the margin path for Electron has been pretty predictable: always been about growing or maintaining your ASP and getting your cadence up to absorb the overheads. With Neutron being reusable, it’s less about that and it's much more about how quickly can we get to reusability on Neutron. And that really will have a a much more accelerated path to margin expansion that we experienced on Electron, where you have to build one for every mission. The power of the fleet model for Neutron, that's already been established—we’ve seen what it can do for SpaceX. You can launch a lot more if you build less. It’s a lot easier to refurbish a rocket than to build a rocket. So that's really the whole premise underpinning the margin expansion because the first launch for Neutron that we talked about earlier, that's just an R&D launch— there's no revenue associated with it. A lot of that R&D is in the rearview mirror and that first rocket, the goal there is to get it to space, successfully re-enter the atmosphere, and do a propulsive soft landing in the ocean. We’re not trying to catch that one or land on a barge. If everything goes really well, the goal would be then, for the second tail or the second rocket to basically land on a barge, And that rocket will probably not also be used. We'll use that for kind of I would say postmortem and really dialing in the block upgrades to the long term architecture of the vehicle, if there's any major changes or minor changes. So it’s really the third tail that we would have the opportunity to land it on the barge and put that into reuse. So you can kind of think about kind of it's the third tail onward that represents the real margin expansion for that business. That's where you can start to see that trajectory, but the first couple launches are going to be negative negative gross margin propositions for sure. ### Reuse Assumptions, Turnaround Time, and Fleet Size (15:33) **Interviewer:** How do we think through the number of times that a rocket can be reused? And is there a way to think about how many rockets you'll want to have built in inventory ready to go at all times once you guys get to maturity, or is it too early to think through that? **Adam Spice (15:52):** But yeah, that's ultimately going to be demand-driven. But if you think about it, the rocket was designed to be reusable 20 times. And if you think about the time to turn a rocket from launch, get it through the refurb, back on the pad — right now, we're being pretty conservative about assuming roughly a quarter to take the vehicle back in, get it ready to be reused. If you look at SpaceX right now, I read online that the estimates are it's about 29 days to put a booster back into service after a launch. So that kind of gives you what the opportunity could look like as how quickly you could turn a vehicle. Now I would say that hopefully we could do it even better than that. Our design criteria for Neutron originally was: can we get the rocket and put it back in a position where it could be relaunched within 24 hours, right? Not that necessarily we see demand driving you into that kind of cadence, but it's really more about how do you constrain cost? Well, the less amount of time that you have to refurb, the less money you're going to spend. So it's all about optimizing your design around easy reusability or efficient reusability. So, we target 20 reuses per Neutron, roughly a quarter to put it back into service. So if you think about — I mentioned earlier like 10 launches per year — that would say that you could do that with, say, three vehicles. Yeah, it's amazing, right? So my current assumption is that we'll build out a fleet of call it four-ish vehicles over the course of the next couple years. And that will be — I mean again, at the relatively slow cadence of turning it every quarter — that would say you could be in a position of launching up to like 16 launches per year off of that fleet, and could do a lot more if you can get your turnaround time much quicker. ### No Mid-Lift Rocket Between Electron and Neutron (17:41) **Interviewer:** Do you guys have any desire to introduce a new rocket that would be somewhere between Electron and Neutron? **Adam Spice (17:49):** No, no, we don't really see a market for that. You know, if you look at Electron, it's able to take most of the satellites that want dedicated launch on the small sat market. There are some payloads that we can't carry that look for alternative rides, but if we were to build like a one-ton, we just don't think the market's really big enough to justify the ROI for a one-ton rocket. So you've got Electron — super efficient, established, very reliable vehicle, priced incredibly well for that small dedicated launch market. You've got Neutron that's really going to be the constellation deployer, and also where you're taking more exquisite satellites into LEO or GEO or beyond. ### Space Systems: How to Model the Business (18:34) **Interviewer:** Let's shift gears a little bit to Space Systems, because I think that's an important part of the story here. Something that people maybe struggle with on Space Systems is how to model it. Is there a way to think through the different business lines, the products, or maybe the programs that are in Space Systems? How big are they today, and where can they go, and how do they ramp? **Adam Spice (18:51):** Space Systems is roughly two-thirds of our revenue today. So people think of us as a launch company — and we are a launch company — but again, we get more of our revenue from Space Systems than from launch. Now, that will probably remix with Neutron coming onto the scene. But that said, we do see a lot of growth opportunities on the Space Systems side. If you take Space Systems, there's roughly two equally sized components of that. There's the subsystems business — think of that as things that we sell, picks and shovels, to other satellite manufacturers — whether those are solar systems from our SolAero acquisition, whether it's reaction wheels and star trackers and sun sensors from our Sinclair acquisition, whether it's ground software from ASI, that acquisition. So we've acquired a lot of businesses that brought these subsystem capabilities, and those businesses again are roughly a third of the total corporate revenue. They're growing at around 20% CAGR. Our non-GAAP gross margins are in the low 40s, with a pretty wide range — where you've got solar at the low end of the gross margins of around 30 points, and you've got other products that are north of 70 points. So there's a pretty wide range there, but overall a blended growth rate of around 20% is about right. We don't see that CAGR changing that much for what we can see right now in the next, say, three to five years. That's more of a market where it's a rising tide because you're selling to a lot of different people. It's not program-specific — it's selling to a lot of diversified customers across a very diversified product range. And then the other half of Space Systems is where we sell full platform solutions — whether those are complete satellite buses or full satellites including the payload. And that business is growing even faster. That was an organic one. So we didn't acquire a spacecraft platform business — we developed that organically using all the acquired technologies, and then built out all the infrastructure to build these full system solutions. We got our first real constellation build opportunity with Globalstar several years ago, and we're now wrapping up that program. And then we won a bigger program with SDA Tranche 2 Transport Layer, and now we've got our hat in the ring for subsequent SDA opportunities and other government and commercial opportunities. So we have a very robust pipeline of those platform sales. But it's very important, I think, when you think about what we're doing and why we're doing things the way that we are — because being a merchant supplier into the satellite market, it's a really nice business, but for us, it's a means to an end. For us, it's a way for us to have other people pay for us to develop and scale capabilities that ultimately we're going to use to build out our own constellation — our own assets on orbit — because that's really what we're going after at the end of the day. That's really the last piece of creating the end-to-end space vision that Pete's been driving for almost the last decade. ### Constellation Ambitions: Vertical Integration and Potential Use Cases (21:38) **Interviewer:** Let's talk about that for a little bit, if you don't mind. Are you guys starting to think through how much that could potentially cost, the time frame for that, and what the use case will eventually be on your own constellation? **Adam Spice (21:57):** We spend a lot of time on the constellation opportunities. I think we sit in a pretty enviable position on the launch side and also selling subsystems to other people. We're seeing what's working and what's not working, right? So I think we're a bit of a canary in the coal mine. So we're not having to just go completely blind into a constellation opportunity. So again, we're building all the capabilities so that when we put our own assets on orbit, we're going to do it in a very vertically integrated way across designing the spacecraft, building them with our own subsystems, launching them on our own rockets, communicating with them with our own ground stations — all of those capabilities. The application is yet TBD, but when you look at the market, I kind of think of space applications in a few meaningful buckets. There's the national security side of the market, and we've seen historically that's one where you can sell hardware into that market. You can also sell services or data into that market — that's really more on the remote sensing / EO side of the market, where companies sell data to the U.S. government in various forms, and they also do some analytics on that in some cases. But we've now also seen examples where the government customer has been turned into basically a consumer of a service — think about Starshield, right? — where they're generating a lot of revenue from what we can tell, selling into the U.S. government off of a secure communications platform. And then of course, also in national security, there's all the — what I consider all the “Golden Dome-ish” type of opportunities: missile warning, missile defense, and so forth. That's the first major bucket. And then I'd say the second major bucket would be commercial opportunities for Earth observation. That's kind of a hybrid business where it sells into government plus commercial customers. And then you've got the communications market more broadly speaking, which is where there's some emerging business models like direct-to-device. You of course have Starlink doing consumer broadband. Project LEO from Amazon — same thing — plus a bunch of other capabilities. And even within communications, you've got consumer broadband, D2D, you've got IoT opportunities. Undoubtedly in the future there'll be opportunities around fleet control for autonomous vehicles, drones, and so forth. So there's just a tremendous amount of vertical diversification in the comms market. So what we're doing right now, rather than saying we've staked a claim on which application we're going for, we're out there building the capabilities to basically be agile in picking what we're going to go exploit — because we think it requires all the pieces to exploit something the way that we've seen SpaceX successfully exploit Starlink. I think there's a few reasons why you could point to why they've been so successful with Starlink. It's not necessarily that they've got the secret sauce on the satellite design capabilities. It's when you marry really good design with incredibly vertically integrated manufacturing, with a captive launch vehicle where you can prioritize your payloads and deploy them at a cost and a cadence that nobody else can compete with. And so for us, that's where again our strategies dovetail with that. We're like: we need Neutron to really close that equation. And so that's why Neutron is so important. It's not everything, but it's very important to our long-term strategy. ### SDA: Transport vs Track, GEOST, and Fixed-Price Risk (25:31) **Interviewer:** You mentioned the Transport Layer. Can we talk a little bit about what is next to come there and what people should be looking for on the next tranches? And then we've talked in the past about how you guys have had a strategy of going after small pieces of these programs up front, doing a really good job on that, and that's kind of gotten you a seat at the table for the next big thing — and how that ties into taking on more risk with fixed-price contracts. I know I just threw a lot at you there, but all within the Transport Layer is kind of what I would like to hear more on. **Adam Spice (26:02):** When we look at SDA — that program, the proliferated warfighter architecture — our first opportunity was in that Transport Layer. So you think about Transport and Track, where Transport is really the communications layer of that constellation architecture. Track is actually the tracking of the missile warning / missile detection aspect of it. So the Transport Layer is where there's been a lot of chatter around whether or not that's something that the government customer will continue to procure hardware for, or whether they're just going to procure a service — very different from Track, which is: there is no service provisioning of missile warning / missile detection. That's the government domain. And so our focus right now has been disproportionately on Track versus Transport. We're executing on Transport. If there's future Transport Layers that do get awarded, we think we're in a really good position because we've got a position of incumbency now. And then on Track — that's one where we've thrown our hat in the ring — and where we acquired an asset in the form of GEOST, which is an IR sensor. We closed that deal, I think it was in August of this year, to really give us a full platform. So now we go in with not only all of the vertically integrated bus capabilities, but now we've got the payload too. So we don't have to cobble together a solution using other people's payload elements. And that's very powerful because, getting to your point on firm fixed-price contracts, the one thing that's really bitten everybody that's been in the business of providing space hardware to customers — government or commercial — is the flimsiness of the supply chain. The supply chain's always been very fragmented, very vulnerable, which puts people — that's why historically I think it's been a cost-plus market, because if you don't have confidence in being able to deliver something on time and schedule, you're not going to want to get bound to that. But when you're very vertically integrated like we are — and like other people who we think are going to succeed are, they're incredibly vertically integrated — it puts you in a position to say, “Look, I can bet on myself.” And so I'll take that firm fixed-price risk, but I'm not going to bet on a dozen other people who've historically not been able to execute on time and schedule, because as the prime you take on the exposure for liquidated damages and such. **Interviewer (28:24):** Do you feel that the customer is looking for more of those fixed-price contracts from you guys in the industry? **Adam Spice (28:29):** Absolutely. I mean, that is — that's all we're seeing. We don't play in the cost-plus parts of the market. Not that we wouldn't, but that's just not where we're — the margins are thin. Like, we don't need to. We'd rather take the risk for the higher margin opportunities. ### Golden Dome: Budget, Entry Points, and Timing Uncertainty (28:40) **Interviewer:** This is a perfect segue into Golden Dome. Number one: Golden Dome — the stuff that we're talking about on the tracking and transport layers — is that just going to be repurposed into Golden Dome and rebranded, or is the $25 billion that people are talking about total incremental funding? **Adam Spice (29:03):** I think the $25 billion that people are talking about is incremental. I don't think SDA Transport and Track are part of that. Those initiatives were taken into scope well before Golden Dome was even discussed as a term. So I think that's just more of the existing maintenance-of-business part of the budget. I think the $25 billion that people are talking about — that's really for new, innovative things that really were not being discussed before in a material way. And those are things that — now that we've got quite a bit of points of entry into the government customer, because we've had the NASA things we've done for years, and in fact we just launched two satellites that are about 2 million kilometers away from Earth now — we launched those on Jeff Bezos' New Glenn vehicle a couple weeks ago. And then of course SDA that we're executing on. Hypersonics is a big piece of our growing Electron product line — that's where we deploy targets, essentially, for the government to develop hypersonic countermeasures and other capabilities. So we have an increasingly audible voice at the table with the government customer because of the different things that we're now providing into that infrastructure. And now GEOST basically puts that even more so. I think we're in a good position to at least now be heard, be able to see what's coming through the pipeline, and be aggressive on getting pieces where they fit for us. **Interviewer (30:28):** There's an expectation that the public was going to know more about the architecture of Golden Dome — I think in November — which I think we're still kind of waiting on. When do you think that we'll have an understanding of what it looks like, and when do you think that awards will start happening and actually hitting backlogs? **Adam Spice (30:46):** I think that's very hard to predict. I think potentially — we're still pretty fresh out of the government shutdown, so we don't know whether some of these things were day-to-day pushes or whether there's a much bigger delay because of other things being reprioritized. So I don't think we have the insight to really be that helpful on that one. ### M&A Strategy and Capital Allocation (31:06) **Interviewer:** You guys have been really successful with your M&A platform. What should people be thinking about and expecting out of you guys from an M&A perspective and the capital allocation going forward? **Adam Spice (31:29):** Our pipeline has never been more full right now of opportunities, and it's a diverse set of opportunities. I think what I'm most confident that you'll see is a continued push towards vertical integration of key capabilities. I mentioned before: having a comms platform / comms payload capability is going to be foundational for us. So we're out there right now looking at key pieces of that signal chain — beam-steerable antenna arrays, modems, PAs, encryption boxes — those kinds of things that allow you to build a full in-house comms payload. And whether that comms payload gets pointed at consumer broadband versus D2D versus encrypted government comms — you need those table stakes anyway you look at it. So that's kind of what you'll see from us, I believe, over the course of the next 12 to 18 months. You'll see hopefully a series of those things come into focus. We do look at needle-moving or transformational types of deals where it gets us into new markets in a meaningful way quickly. But Pete and I are pretty conservative by nature — we're not going to do “bet the company” things. And we're also very careful that, for example on the constellation side — because we do get the question: “Are you guys going to go out and buy spectrum? Are you guys going to do this, that, and the other thing to preserve your spot for your future constellation opportunity?” — and the answer is probably not, because we need to dovetail very carefully that we don't put the cart before the horse in investing in things that we ultimately need Neutron to deploy. So having incremental lift capacity available to us to use captively is realistically probably a three-year-away thing. We think customer demand is going to take the first three years as we scale that vehicle, and only once you get into this rapid-cadence reusability model in a meaningful way can you get to those 10, 20, 30 types of launches per year, where it gives you that SpaceX-like internal capacity. So we’ve got to be careful about timing and sequencing of these things. So I think those kinds of deals are more unlikely, although we continue to look at a lot of stuff. Those kind of deal are I don't think too likely. ### Closing Thoughts: Cap Table Perception and International Growth (33:47) **Interviewer:** Is there anything you feel is misunderstood about the story or about the company that you'd like to address with the investment community? **Adam Spice (34:00):** No, I think the knowledge base has gotten pretty good. I mean, if you looked at our cap table a year ago, it looked dramatically different than it looks like today. We were a lot of retail. We still have a lot of retail. But the institutional investors that we had were largely fast money, and if you look at our shareholder roster now, it's a pretty enviable list of quality long-only, strategic-minded investors. So that to me is probably the most encouraging thing. So I think people are getting educated on it. I think probably if there's anything that's misunderstood, it's an underappreciation for the growth that companies like us are going to see in the international markets. The geopolitics have created less of a sharing of capabilities, and we’re moving from decades of efficient, concentrated spend by the U.S. government to now you're going to have a lot of sovereigns having to spend their own money. And it's going to be a redundant spend model where people are going to be buying a lot of the same things, but in different parts of the world. And I think there's only a few — I mean, most of the industrial base for those kind of capabilities is in the United States. So I think as much as a lot of these other regions want to buy within the region, it's going to take time to develop the flight heritage for a lot of these capabilities. So I think there's going to be disproportionate growth opportunities for well-positioned U.S. assets to exploit that. **Interviewer (35:27):** Makes sense. Well, I think we're up at time. Adam, thank you so much for being here with us today. **Adam Spice (35:32):** Yeah, thanks for having me. Great.